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Massachusetts Appeals Court Summary Dispositions Pursuant to Rule 23.0 (formerly Rule 1:28)

Docket Number - 24-P-1188main content

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COMMONWEALTH vs. REGINALD BOWMAN.
2/11/2026
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1188
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
REGINALD BOWMAN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant,
Reginald Bowman, sought leave from the single justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass.
1501 (2017). The single justice granted his request. This
appeal followed.
The defendant was arrested outside a retail store in
Boston's Back Bay neighborhood after Boston police received an
anonymous tip from a 911 caller who purportedly witnessed an
individual pass a firearm to someone fitting the defendant's
description in broad daylight before they both entered the
store. On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge
2
erred by concluding (1) that the anonymous witness's tip was
reliable; and (2) that the police officer who arrested the
defendant had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him for a
weapon. We affirm.
Background. The following facts are drawn from the judge's
findings and from undisputed evidence in the record that he
implicitly credited. See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass.
645, 654-655 (2018); Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass.
429, 436 (2015). The defendant does not challenge any of the
judge's findings.
On October 30, 2021, at approximately 2:53 P.M., an
anonymous person called 911 and reported that he was outside the
Nike store at 200 Newbury Street in Boston's Back Bay
neighborhood. He stated that he had observed a Black "kid" in a
red "hood" pass a gun to another Black "kid" in a black "hood",
before they both went into the store. The 911 caller stated
that his child mentioned that the "guy" in the black hood also
wore a black ski mask, though the caller admitted he did not see
that. With that, the 911 caller hung up.
The dispatcher then called the 911 caller back and asked
for more information. The 911 caller reiterated that "the kid
in the red hood gave the gun to the kid in the black hood" and
added that the kid in the black hood "put [the gun] in his
pocket" before going into the store. The 911 caller described
3
them both as between sixteen and eighteen years old and
approximately 5'10" to 5'11" in height. The 911 caller
indicated that the male in the red hood was skinnier, while the
male in the black hood was medium-sized. The 911 caller refused
to identify himself or cooperate further. To the contrary, he
indicated that he had already left the area and hung up again.
The dispatcher immediately broadcast this information,
1
and
two Boston Police officers, Philip Kearney and his partner,
responded. They arrived at the scene within three to five
minutes of the radio call. They were among the first of
approximately twenty officers to respond. Upon arrival, they
encountered a crowded scene —- at least fifty people inside the
store and between fifty and one hundred gathered outside.
Officer Kearney entered the store, looking for a thin,
young Black male in a red hoodie and a young Black male in a
black hoodie and ski mask. Near the register, he observed two
young men matching the description provided. Officer Kearney
did not engage them. Instead, officers spoke with store
personnel who reported that nothing was amiss. Officer Kearney
then walked outside and stood by. While he was outside, Officer
Kearney turned on his body-worn camera.
1
The dispatcher referred to suspects wearing "hoodies"
rather than "hoods." We adopt that convention.
4
After some time, a thin young Black man in a red hoodie
exited the store, wearing a surgical mask. He was with a young
Black man wearing a black and gray hoodie, but no mask.
Officers stopped them and pat-frisked them but found nothing
incriminating.
Officer Kearney recognized the young man in the red hoodie
as one of the two people he had seen at the register. Because
this young man was now with a different person -- the young man
in the gray and black hoodie without a mask -– Officer Kearney
concluded that the young man in the black hoodie and ski mask
was still inside the store. Accordingly, Officer Kearney re-
entered the store to look for him. The person in the black
hoodie was seated on a bench in the middle of the store behind a
group of people. He was vigilant and looking at Officer
Kearney. Almost immediately after Kearney passed him, the
person in the black hoodie got up to leave the store and Kearney
followed.
2
The defendant turned left onto Newbury Street away
from the large group of officers who had gathered outside the
2
Officer Kearney's body-worn camera did not capture the
defendant seated near the entrance. Rather, it revealed that
Officer Kearney entered the store, immediately walked to the
register, turned around and saw the defendant walking toward the
exit. Officer Kearney followed the defendant out of the store.
See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 654-655 (2018)
(appellate court may review documentary evidence independently).
The distinction is not material to our analysis.
5
store and the young man in the red hoodie, who had been stopped
by two of those officers as he exited the store onto Exeter
Street and was being detained.
Officer Kearney's body-worn camera depicted the defendant
walking at a normal gait down Newbury Street with his hands at
his side. The defendant did not look back to see if Officer
Kearney was following him. Officer Kearney approached the
defendant on the sidewalk from behind and called out, "My man
can I just talk to you for a sec?" The defendant turned around;
he was wearing a black ski mask. Officer Kearney immediately
walked toward him. Officer Kearney testified that as he
approached the defendant, he saw a heavy object weighing down
the pocket on the front of the defendant's hoodie. Based on his
training and experience, Kearney believed the defendant "might
have a weapon." Officer Kearney quickly grabbed the defendant's
arm, asked, "Do you have anything right here?", patted his
hoodie pocket, and felt "a shape consistent with . . . a
firearm." As he did so, he saw the handle of a firearm.
Immediately after feeling the object, he pressed the defendant
against a parked car and called out for assistance from other
officers. His body-worn camera footage established that roughly
two seconds elapsed from the moment Officer Kearney grabbed the
defendant's arm, to the pat frisk and confirmation of a firearm,
to the call for assistance.
6
Officer Kearney then placed the defendant under arrest and
asked if he had a license to carry a firearm. The defendant
responded that "he was not from around here."
Discussion. "In reviewing a decision on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear
error but conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate
findings and conclusions of law" (quotations and citation
omitted). Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431.
"To justify a warrantless investigatory stop, the police
must have reasonable suspicion that the person they stop 'has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.'"
Commonwealth v. Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 272 (2025),
quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405 (1974).
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable
facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the
officer's experience" (quotation and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1, 8 (2023). "The
test is an objective one." Silva, supra, at 406.
"When police suspicion arises not from officers' own
observations but from an informant’s tip, . . . the Commonwealth
has the burden of establishing both the informant’s reliability
and the basis of [his] knowledge, although police corroboration
may make up for deficiencies in one or both of those factors."
Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 66 (1997),
7
citing Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 (1990). "The two
prongs of this analysis may also be referred to as the basis of
knowledge test and the veracity test" (quotation and citation
omitted). Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. at 273.
The basis of knowledge prong is satisfied where the caller
"was describing [his] own firsthand observations." Commonwealth
v. Westgate, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 552 (2022). However, in a
reasonable suspicion case, "[e]stablishing the veracity prong
where an anonymous 911 caller is involved is less
straightforward, as no evidence regarding his or her past
reliability or honesty typically will be available."
Commonwealth v. Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 46 (2018).
The reliability of an anonymous tip may be established if
the caller believes that he can be identified by police.
"[C]allers who are aware that their calls are being recorded and
that their telephone numbers can be traced" are thought to be
less likely to make false reports. Manha, 479 Mass. at 47.
Conversely, "a caller who believes the call is anonymous is not
accorded the reliability of a caller who believes they can be
identified, because a caller who believes they are anonymous
will not be deterred by the risk of being charged with false
reporting." Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. at 274. "[E]ven if the
police are able to recover the telephone number and identity of
a 911 caller, . . . [i]t is the tipster's belief in anonymity,
8
not its reality, that will control his behavior" (quotation and
citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Depeiro, 473 Mass. 450, 455
(2016). Here, we must treat the 911 caller as anonymous because
"[he] did not testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress,
and there was no evidence provided regarding [his] identity or
whether [he] knew that [he] was identifiable to police." Manha,
supra.
The motion judge found that the 911 caller's basis of
knowledge was adequately established because he was reporting
his first-hand observation that a thin young Black man in a red
hoodie passed a firearm to a medium sized Black man of roughly
the same age and height in a black hoodie. As for the veracity
prong, the motion judge acknowledged that because the officers
knew nothing about the 911 caller, they could not know whether
he was being truthful. However, he noted that the officers were
able to independently corroborate the information provided by
the caller through their investigation of the details provided
by the caller, and that independent corroboration could satisfy
the veracity prong.
The defendant challenges the judge's finding that the
anonymous witness's basis of knowledge was adequately
established. The defendant characterizes the description of the
suspects as so broad and general that it "could fit many people
in the area." We disagree.
9
We conclude that the 911 caller's basis of knowledge was
established by his report of a first-hand observation at
2:53 P.M. that a skinnier young Black man in a red hoodie had
given a gun to a medium-sized young Black man of roughly the
same age and height in a black hoodie, who put it in his pocket
before they both entered the store. The basis of knowledge
prong is satisfied because the caller "was describing [his] own
firsthand observations." Westgate, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 552.
We understand the defendant's argument here to be that the
anonymous tip was too vague "to identify a determinate person"
with sufficient particularity. Commonwealth v. Sertyl, 101
Mass. App. Ct. 836, 840 (2022). See Commonwealth v. Warren, 475
Mass. 530, 534 (2016) ("The essence of the reasonable suspicion
inquiry is whether the police have an individualized suspicion
that the person seized is the perpetrator of the suspected
crime); Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 243 (2010) (stop
based on dispatch is lawful if "the description of the suspect
conveyed by the dispatch had sufficient particularity that it
was reasonable for the police to suspect a person matching that
description").
Here, four factors allowed Officer Kearney to identify a
person matching the description in the tip with "sufficient
particularity." First, the tip described a 5'10", skinny, young
Black male in a red hoodie together with a medium-sized, young
10
Black male approximately the same age and height in a black
hoodie, wearing a ski mask. Officer Kearney identified two
suspects together fitting every aspect of that description.
Contrast Warren, 475 Mass. at 535 (suspects described as three
black males, two wearing dark clothing and one wearing a red
hoodie; no description of facial features, height, weight, or
other physical characteristics). Second, because Officer
Kearney responded very quickly -- within three to five
minutes -- his initial identification of the suspects was very
close in time to the 911 call. See id. at 536 ("proximity of
the stop to the time and location of the crime is a relevant
factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis" and "[p]roximity is
accorded greater probative value in the reasonable suspicion
calculus when the distance is short and the timing is close").
Third, because the tip indicated that the suspects went into a
specific store, Officer Kearney identified the suspects in the
precise location the caller said they would be. See id.
Fourth, Officer Kearney's quick investigation, creating a tight
and consistent relationship between the time and location of
both the tip and the identification, corroborated the
particularity of the tip. Contrast Warren, 475 Mass. at 535-537
(victim described three suspects carrying his stolen backpack;
defendant was one of two people stopped, and neither was
carrying a backpack; suspects' flight path was "mere
11
conjecture"; defendant was stopped a mile from the crime scene
and approximately twenty-five minutes after the crime; "timing
and location of the stop lacked a rational relationship to each
other"); Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 72 (report that "one of
[a] group of [B]lack youths had a gun did not serve to narrow
the range of suspects" to anyone in the group, much less the
defendant). At that point, Officer Kearney had properly
narrowed his investigation to the defendant.
As noted above, police must also establish the reliability
of an anonymous tip through investigation before they may seize
and search a suspect. "Corroboration by police of an
informant's predictions as to what the police will find,
particularly predictive information regarding nonobvious details
beyond those apparent to a casual bystander, is perhaps of
greatest significance in justifying police inquiries in reliance
on the tip" (quotation and citation omitted). Grinkley, 44
Mass. App. Ct. at 70. See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 458 Mass.
1017, 1018-1019 (2010) (stop and search based on unverified
anonymous tip unreasonable because there were "no predictions by
the caller of facts later confirmed by the police, to show the
caller had inside knowledge; and no evidence of corroboration by
the police of more than innocent details"); Morales, 106 Mass.
App. Ct. at 275 (same); Sertyl, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 840 (stop
12
and search based on anonymous 911 call unreasonable because no
evidence of caller's reliability).
For purposes of determining the reliability of the tip, the
motion judge cited Officer Kearney's testimony that when he
first entered the store, he saw a thin Black male wearing a red
hoodie with a Black male wearing a black hoodie and a ski mask.
On its own, this was at best an "obvious nonincriminating fact[]
that would be easily observable to any bystander" and not
"inside information that provides a legitimate inference of
personal knowledge" of criminal conduct. Grinkley, 44 Mass.
App. Ct. at 67. However, Officer Kearney was able to
corroborate the veracity of the 911 caller's tip with additional
details he observed.
After police stopped the young man in the red hoodie,
Officer Kearney went into the store, located the defendant, and
followed him. As the motion judge noted, Officer Kearney
testified that when he followed the defendant outside the store,
he noticed "something was weighing down the front of his
sweatshirt pocket" that was at least consistent with a firearm.
Officer Kearney testified that he carried a firearm every day
and was familiar with its weight.
3
His observation corroborated
3
The parties agree that the seizure occurred when Officer
Kearney grabbed the defendant's arm. Officer Kearney testified
that he observed the heavy object weighing down the defendant's
front hoodie pocket before the seizure.
13
the 911 caller's report that the medium sized young black man in
the black hoodie put the firearm in his pocket. Together, these
observations suggested that the 911 caller had "inside
information that provides a legitimate inference of personal
knowledge" of criminal conduct. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at
67.
Finally, the fact that both the young man in the red hoodie
and the defendant were wearing masks added something to the
veracity of the 911 caller's tip. The fact that both young men
were wearing masks, after allegedly transferring a firearm, and
immediately before walking into a retail store, was consistent
with an intent to conceal their identity during the commission
of a crime.
4
In total, these facts established the veracity of the 911
caller's tip. Therefore, the tip became a specific and
articulable fact that, combined with the other evidence Officer
4
We note that masking was a common practice in October
2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. See
https://www.who.int/europe/emergencies/situations/covid-19 (The
World Health Organization declared an end to the global COVID-19
pandemic on May 5, 2023). As Officer Kearney's body-worn camera
footage illustrated, several shoppers in the store and several
police officers, were wearing masks. Accordingly, the fact that
the defendant was wearing a mask, by itself, would not have
corroborated the anonymous tip.
14
Kearney had developed, supported an objective basis to form a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant possessed a firearm.
The defense also challenges the reliability of the 911
caller's tip on the grounds that it did not establish a basis
for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because "the mere
possession and carrying of a gun is not a crime." Grinkley, 44
Mass. App. Ct. at 70. The defendant argues that this case is
analogous to Gomes, 458 Mass. at 1017. In that case, the
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that an anonymous tip that a
man was standing on a street pointing a gun in the air did not
supply police with reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop where "[t]here was no evidence that the gun
had been fired, pointed at another person, or otherwise handled
in a way that posed a threat to someone." Id. at 1019.
This case is distinguishable from Gomes because Officer
Kearney's investigation corroborated the 911 caller's report
that one person who appeared to be under twenty-one years old
had passed a gun to a second, masked person, who also appeared
to be under twenty-one, before they both walked into a retail
store. Therefore, at the time Officer Kearney seized the
defendant, there was an objective basis to form a reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the
defendant planned to commit an armed robbery, in violation of
G. L. c. 265, § 17, when he walked into the store. See
15
Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 689-690 (2013) (listing
elements of armed robbery). Moreover, because the defendant
appeared to be under twenty-one,
5
the evidence supported a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant illegally possessed a
firearm. See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (persons under twenty-one
are prohibited from carrying a firearm). In short, there was
objective evidence that the suspect "[had] committed, [was]
committing, or [was] about to commit a crime" (citation
omitted). Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. at 272.
6
Contrast Id. at
276 (finding anonymous tip did not warrant reasonable suspicion
where "the police were unable to corroborate the witness's tip
in its assertion of potential illegality").
Conclusion. Officer Kearney's seizure and pat frisk of the
defendant were reasonable. The motion judge's orders denying
the defendant's motion to suppress and motion for
reconsideration are affirmed.
So ordered.
5
In fact, the defendant had just turned twenty-one two
months before his arrest.
6
Because Officer Kearney's corroboration of the anonymous
tip established an objective basis to form a reasonable
suspicion that the defendant illegally possessed a firearm and
planned to commit an armed robbery, there was also an objective
basis to conclude that the defendant was armed and dangerous,
justifying a pat frisk. See Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484
Mass. 34, 36 (2020).
16
By the Court (Meade,
Desmond & Wood, JJ. ),
7
Clerk
Entered: February 11, 2026.
7
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.