MROD

Massachusetts Appeals Court Summary Dispositions Pursuant to Rule 23.0 (formerly Rule 1:28)

Docket Number - 25-P-0107main content

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CMJ MANAGEMENT vs. DORIS RODENSKY.
1/13/2026
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-107
CMJ MANAGEMENT
1
vs.
DORIS RODENSKY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a summary process bench trial in the Housing Court,
judgment entered awarding possession to CMJ Management (landlord
or plaintiff). Doris Rodensky (tenant or defendant) appeals
from the judgment and an order denying her subsequent motion to
alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the notice to quit
mischaracterized her son as a "guest," that the son's alleged
assault of the landlord's employee therefore cannot be a basis
for termination of the tenancy, and that any other reasons for
termination were not included in the notice to quit and
accordingly were improperly considered by the judge. We affirm.
1
As agent for the Village at Fawcett's Pond.
2
On April 21, 2024, the tenant's son, who does not live in
the apartment, struck the "maintenance supervisor," who lives in
an adjacent apartment, in the face, knocking him to the ground,
and then hit him again during the ensuing struggle.
2
The
supervisor suffered a concussion, went to the hospital in an
ambulance, reported the incident to the police, and obtained a
G. L. c. 258E harassment prevention order. Immediately after
the incident, the son entered the tenant's apartment, where he
was subsequently arrested.
Four days later, on April 25, 2024, the landlord served the
tenant with a notice to quit, terminating the tenancy effective
June 1, 2024. The lease requires that any notice of termination
delivered to the tenant "state the grounds for termination with
enough detail for the Tenant to prepare a defense." The
detailed notice based termination on the physical assault and
the harassment prevention order, then specifically cited
paragraph 23(c)(6) of the lease. Paragraph 23(c)(6) permits
termination of the lease because of "criminal activity by a
tenant, any member of the tenant's household, a guest or another
person under the tenant's control" that "threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
2
The incident occurred while the tenant's son was at the
plaintiff's property.
3
residents (including property management staff residing on the
premises)."
Following a summary process bench trial, final judgment
issued "for the [p]laintiff for possession" of the premises.
The tenant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment
and the same judge denied that motion.
"When reviewing the decision of a trial judge in a summary
process action, we accept [the judge's] findings of fact as true
unless they are clearly erroneous, but we scrutinize without
deference the legal standard which the judge applied to the
facts" (quotations and citation omitted). Cambridge St. Realty,
LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 123 (2018).
The notice to quit provided to the tenant was "legally
adequate." Cambridge St. Realty, LLC, 481 Mass. at 130. For a
notice to be defective, it "must involve a material error or
omission, i.e., a defect that has some meaningful practical
effect." Id. Additionally, where (as here) a lease provides a
requirement that a notice provide specificity for the grounds
for termination, the notice must comply with that requirement to
be effective. See id. at 131. Here, the notice informed the
tenant that her lease would terminate more than thirty days
later, described the incident causing termination as an
"unprovoked attack" by the son on the landlord's employee while
4
on the property, referenced that there was a tenant-guest
relationship between the tenant and the son, and recited the
language from the lease authorizing termination under these
circumstances. Thus, the notice's recitation of the relevant
conduct, identification of the parties, and connection of those
to the appropriate lease provision satisfied the lease's
requirement that the landlord "state the grounds for termination
with enough detail for the Tenant to prepare a defense." The
notice was more than adequate. See id. at 132 (holding notice
to terminate United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development-mandated lease addendum effective where notice
"detailed conduct that violated certain accurately referenced
lease provisions").
Furthermore, the judge's finding that the son's conduct as
alleged in the notice violated "Paragraph 23(c)(6) of the
[tenant]'s lease" and that the landlord had therefore
"established its case for possession of the premises" was
correct, based on subsidiary findings of fact which were not
clearly erroneous. The notice to quit and the judge's decision
based termination on lease paragraph 23(c)(6), which authorizes
termination for "criminal activity by . . . a guest or another
person under the tenant's control" that "threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
5
residents (including property management staff residing on the
premises)."
3
The judge credited the witnesses' testimony that the son
would "go[] to the [tenant]'s apartment almost every day," that
the son hit the maintenance supervisor twice, and that the
maintenance supervisor resides in an apartment on the premises.
Accepting these facts as true, see Cambridge St. Realty, LLC,
481 Mass. at 123, the judge correctly concluded that the lease
permitted termination pursuant to paragraph 23(c)(6). We are
unconvinced by the tenant's argument that her son was not a
guest, but regardless, the judge's decision clearly and
accurately rested on the relationship between the tenant and her
son, the son's conduct, and the provisions of the lease
authorizing termination under those circumstances. Thus, the
3
The lease, as a "Model Lease For Subsidized Programs,"
derives its termination provisions from 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l),
under which a "person under the tenant's control" refers to a
person to whom "the tenant has permitted access to the premises"
(citation omitted). Department of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002).
6
judgment awarding possession to the landlord was correct.
4
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion to alter
or amend affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman,
D'Angelo & Allen, JJ. ),
5
Clerk
Entered: January 13, 2026.
4
Because we hold the judge's order was proper on the
grounds stated above, we need not and do not address the
application of the community rules and regulations to the lease
termination.
5
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.