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40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY LLC vs. KYLE ANDRESS & another.

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1/9/2026

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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1426

40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY LLC

vs.

KYLE ANDRESS & another.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, 40 Meadowbrook Lane Realty LLC

(Meadowbrook), and the defendants, Kyle Andress and his father,

Gary Andress (hereinafter Andresses), own abutting properties in

the town of Norton. Meadowbrook purchased its property in

November 2018 and leases it to Lincoln Meadows Farm, a limited

liability company owned by Melissa Doucette. Doucette lives on

the property and also operates an equine boarding facility and

riding school there. The Andresses purchased their property,

which consists of a large tract of undeveloped land,

approximately four months later in March 2019. Access to the

Gary Andress.

Andresses' property is by a private right of way known as Pine

Needle Lane (lane). The lane is a narrow dirt road which runs

along the western boundary of Meadowbrook's property and

proceeds north over the Andresses' property.

Doucette's

students and other horseback riders use the lane for horseback

riding. They also use two trails known as the Horse Farm Loop

trail and the Crane Street trail (trails), portions of which are

located on the Andresses' land.

The Andresses plan to build two homes on their property and

make improvements to the lane, including widening and paving it,

to do so.

The parties soon realized they had conflicting views

regarding the boundaries of their properties, ownership thereof,

and rights to use the lane and the trails.

The dispute became

More specifically, the lane leads northerly from another

private way, Meadowbrook Lane, across a portion of Meadowbrook's

land along its western boundary and then onto the Andresses'

land.

As set forth in their counterclaim, the construction of

two homes will require improvements to the lane consisting of

"constructing a compacted gravel roadway together with requisite

appurtenances (i.e. minimum width, minor drainage control

components, utilities, etc.) so as to provide adequate vehicular

access" to the property.

Doucette initially believed that she owned the land on

which the trails are located. The judge, however, found that

the trails encroach upon the Andresses' property in three

places.

acrimonious when the parties blocked each other's access to both

the lane and the trails.

Ultimately, Meadowbrook commenced this action seeking,

among other things, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the

Andresses from improving the lane in any manner that would be

detrimental to the "wellbeing of horses that customarily use

[it]." The Andresses then filed counterclaims (and an amended

counterclaim) seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive

relief as regards their right to improve the lane. They also

sought to establish the location of the boundary line between

Meadowbrook's northern boundary and their southern boundary, as

well as to quiet title to approximately 3.67 acres (disputed

area) located along that same boundary line.

Following a jury-waived trial, a judge of the Superior

Court determined that Meadowbrook has a prescriptive easement

over the Andresses' property "in the area of [the trails] for

all such land uses, including the riding of horses."

With

The judge found that "[u]pon [the Andresses] blocking

access to Doucette and her customers along the horse farm loop

trail, Doucette blocked [the Andresses'] access to Pine Needle

Lane."

Meadowbrook and the Andresses also brought trespass claims

against each other. These claims were dismissed by agreement

prior to trial and are not before us.

The judgment also required the Andresses to remove

"signage, trail cameras, and/or alarms previously placed along

the prescriptive easement."

respect to the lane, the judge concluded that Meadowbrook has a

thirty foot right of way along the entire length of the lane.

The judge also found that the Andresses have a right of way on

the lane "for travel only to access their land" and specified

that the Andresses do "not have the right . . . to widen, change

the topography, install conduits, pipes, poles, or any other

instrumentalities needed in connection with utilities." In

addition, the judge permanently enjoined the Andresses from

interfering with Meadowbrook's continued use of the lane and the

trails. Lastly, the judge concluded that the Andresses had not

sustained their burden of establishing the northern/southern

boundary line between the properties or to quiet title to the

disputed area. This appeal ensued.

The Andresses contend that the judge erred in concluding

that Meadowbrook had acquired an easement by prescription over

the trails for two reasons. First, they assert that the judge

should not have considered the issue in the first place because

the pleadings did not adequately raise it. Second, the

Andresses argue that, in any event, Meadowbrook failed to

establish two elements of a prescriptive easement: that its use

of the trails for horseback riding was for the requisite time

period and that its use was "adverse" to the Andresses' property

rights. In addition, they argue that the judge (1) improperly

precluded them from improving the lane where they had a deeded

right to do so and G. L. c. 187, § 5 authorizes such

improvements by implication; (2) erred in failing to establish

the "north/south boundary between the parties' land;" and

(3) abused her discretion by permitting Doucette to testify

about the type of road surface that would be harmful to horses.

For the reasons discussed below, we remand the case only to

modify the amended judgment to the extent it prohibits the

Andresses from making any improvements to the lane including

those that would not be detrimental to its current use by

horses. The remainder of the amended judgment is affirmed.

Background. The history of the ownership of the two

properties and the use of the properties by the parties'

predecessors and others are set forth in detail in the judge's

findings of fact and rulings of law. We need not summarize that

history here. Instead, we refer to those facts which are

relevant to our analysis during our discussion of the issues

raised on appeal.

1. The prescriptive easement claim. As noted, the

Andresses challenge the judge's conclusion that Meadowbrook had

established an easement by prescription over the trails located

on their property. We first address the Andresses' argument

that they had no notice of the claim because the pleadings did

not adequately raise the issue.

Although it is true that Meadowbrook's complaint does not

allege that a prescriptive easement exists, we discern no

reasonable basis for concluding that the Andresses were taken by

surprise at trial or unfairly prejudiced by the admission of

evidence relating to whether a prescriptive easement had been

established. The Andresses filed an amended counterclaim in

which they sought to quiet title to the land on which the trails

are partially located, and asserted that Meadowbrook "has no

right, title, or interest" therein. Accordingly, the Andresses

should have been on notice that the challenged evidence would be

forthcoming to rebut that claim. And, in fact, there was at

least some notice. The parties specifically referred to this

issue in their joint pretrial memorandum. Under the section

entitled "Parties' Statement of the Case," the parties

acknowledged "[t]o the extent that parts of those trails are on

the [Andresses'] property, 40 Meadowbrook has acquired a

prescriptive easement over them." We recognize that the parties

anticipated that Meadowbrook would move to amend the complaint

to add a prescriptive easement claim.

However, Meadowbrook's

Footnote one to the parties' joint pretrial memorandum

states that "Meadowbrook intends to move to amend the

[c]omplaint to add that prescriptive easement claim." The joint

pretrial memorandum further states that the Andresses would

oppose a motion to amend the complaint to add a prescriptive

easement claim not because it would be unreasonable to do so but

because such an amendment would be "futile" and fail as a matter

failure to do so was not a fatal error. To the contrary, while

an amendment to the complaint or a motion to amend the pleadings

to conform to the evidence would have been appropriate, the

failure to do either "does not affect the result of the trial of

these issues." K.G.M. Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky, 468 Mass.

247, 257 (2014) (holding Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 [b] does not

require parties to amend pleadings); see also Mass. R. Civ. P.

15 (b), 365 Mass. 761 (1974).

In addition, we note that the issue was addressed

throughout the trial, starting with Meadowbrook's opening

statement in which counsel claimed that Meadowbrook had acquired

a prescriptive easement. Although counsel for the Andresses'

objected, they did not ask for a continuance or insist that the

complaint be amended. Furthermore, each time the Andresses

objected to evidence relating to the establishment of a

prescriptive easement during the trial, Meadowbrook's counsel

responded by asserting that the issue had been properly raised

based on the Andresses' counterclaim and also in the parties'

pretrial memorandum. In fact, at one point, in response to the

Andresses' continued objections, the judge stated,

"It's mentioned. We've already been through this. . . .

I'm going to listen to the evidence. You can argue all you

want when we have our conference at the end on findings and

of law because Meadowbrook could not establish "continuous and

uninterrupted use of said trails."

rulings. I'm happy to hear it at that point in time. The

evidence will be coming in. Your objection is noted for

the record."

The issue was raised again in the Andresses' motion to

correct the judgment. When the motion was addressed, they

asserted that the prescriptive easement issue had not been

properly raised to which the judge responded,

"Then why did we have those . . . two neighbors that you

sufficiently cross-examined? You cross-examined them all

on issues as to how long they had lived there, what they

knew in terms of the usage of the property and whatever

else. And, certainly, they were listed in . . . the

memoranda, very well-disclosed long ago. What did you

think they were being called to trial for?"

Lastly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting

evidence in support of the prescriptive easement claim. Such

evidence was relevant to rebut the Andresses' claim that

Meadowbrook had no right, title, or interest in the trails at

issue. It was also relevant to the Andresses' claim that

Meadowbrook's use of the trails was permissive.

We now turn to the Andresses' claim that the judge erred in

finding that Meadowbrook had established use of the trails for

horseback riding for the requisite time period and that such use

was "adverse" to the Andresses' property rights.

"An easement by prescription is acquired by the (1)

continuous and uninterrupted, (2) open and notorious, and (3)

adverse use of another's land (4) for a period of not less than

twenty years." White v. Hartigan, 464 Mass. 400, 413 (2013).

Unlike adverse possession, exclusive use of the land is not an

element. See Boothroyd v. Bogartz, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 40, 44 n.9

(2007). Although, as will be discussed below, the judge found

that the Andresses had not established the exact location of

their southern boundary, she was able to determine that portions

of the trails that Meadowbrook's customers and guests use for

horseback riding encroach on the Andresses' property in three

places. She further concluded that use of the trails in their

current location dates back to the 1970s, thereby exceeding the

twenty-year requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the judge

credited and subsequently relied on the testimony of Ted Marvel,

an abutter who grew up on Meadowbrook Lane and testified that he

and others used the trails for various forms of recreation since

he was a child. The judge also credited the testimony of

Doucette and the prior immediate title owner of the Meadowbrook

property, Albert Reed. Like Doucette, Reed operated a horse

farm on the property which he purchased in 2004. He too used

the trails and observed guests of the horse farm using the

trails.

The Andresses argue that the testimony on which the judge

relied to conclude that the trails had been used for horseback

riding for over twenty years was insufficient because the

witnesses (Marvel and Reed) testified that other neighbors also

used the trails. This argument fails. As noted, exclusive

possession is not required for a prescriptive easement. See

Boothroyd, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 44 n.9.

The Andresses also assert that any use of the trails at

issue was permissive, thereby defeating the establishment of a

prescriptive easement. In support of this assertion they point

to a "Revocation of License" recorded in 2019 by Morna and

William Bucklin, the Andresses' predecessors in title, which

purported to revoke "all rights and permission previously

granted to the Lincoln Meadows Horse Farm located at 40

Meadowbrook Lane, its owners employees and clients relative to

all purposes including access for hiking and walking or riding

of horses on [the Andresses' property]." The judge properly

rejected this argument after concluding that there was no

evidence that the Bucklins had first granted permission or a

license to Meadowbrook or its predecessors to use their property

for purposes of horseback riding. In other words, the judge

reasoned that because there was no license to revoke, the

recorded revocation did not amount to proof of preexisting

permission.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the judge's

finding that Meadowbrook and its predecessors used the trails

for over twenty years without the permission of the Andresses'

predecessors was amply supported by the evidence. Accordingly,

there was no error in the conclusion that Meadowbrook has

acquired an easement by prescription over those portions of the

trails that encroach on the Andresses' property.

3. The northern/southern boundary. The judge concluded

that the Andresses had not met their burden of establishing the

location of their southern boundary. They argue that they did

so based on the fact that the description of the southern

boundary within multiple deeds of their chain of title did not

materially change over the years whereas the description of

Meadowbrook's northern border did change. That the description

of the boundaries of the Andresses' property did not change over

the course of time may well be true, but here the judge properly

relied on the opinion of Meadowbrook's surveyor Robert Babcock,

the only surveyor to testify at trial. He explained that the

northern/southern boundary between the properties is "very

confusing," that "there are no original monuments out [there],"

and the "line fluctuates." He testified that he "attempted to

put [the boundary] down as best [he] possibly could. . . . If

there's additional evidence or records or another additional

surveyor looked at it, they could very well come up with a

different line than I do along the northerly line [of

Meadowbrook's property]." He further testified that while he

was confident about the location of the westerly boundary line,

southerly boundary line, and easterly boundary line (the river),

he was "less confident" about the northern boundary line of the

property. Given Babcock's testimony, we discern no error in the

judge's conclusion that the Andresses had not met their burden

to establish the location of their southern boundary line.

4. Scope of the Andresses' easement over the lane. The

parties have no dispute regarding the location of the lane or

that the Andresses have an easement over it to access their

property. The disagreement focuses on the scope of the

easement. The amended judgment specifically prohibits the

Andresses from taking "any actions on the right of way [the

lane] which would be detrimental to horses." The Andresses

contend that the judge erred because their rights are

established by deeds dating back to the 1700s that include an

express right of way over the lane which is an unlimited general

easement. Therefore, they argue, the judge could not lawfully

limit the scope of the easement by prohibiting them from

improving the lane. Significantly, however, the judge found

that the Bucklins and a predecessor to the Meadowbrook property,

Carolyn Leaonard, were involved in litigation over the use of

the lane and in 2001 entered into a stipulation, incorporated

into a judgment, which recognized the Bucklins' right of way

over the lane, but limited it by providing that they "shall not

make any improvements to the surface of said way which would be

detrimental to the well-being of the horses which customarily

use the same."

The judge determined that the stipulation

defines the present scope of the easement.

The Andresses do not challenge the validity of the

stipulation on which the judge relied. Rather, they argue that

the stipulation has no bearing on their right to improve the

lane by, among other things, installing utility components,

because their right to do so is authorized under G. L. c. 187,

§ 5. That section provides in pertinent part:

"The owner or owners of real estate abutting on a private

way who have by deed existing rights of ingress and egress

upon such way or other private ways shall have the right by

implication to place, install or construct in, on, along,

under and upon said private way or other private ways

pipes, conduits, manholes and other appurtenances necessary

for the transmission of gas, electricity, telephone, water

and sewer service, provided such facilities do not

unreasonably obstruct said private way or other private

ways, and provided that such use of the private way or

other private ways does not interfere with or be

inconsistent with the existing use by others of such way or

other private ways."

G. L. c. 187, § 5.

As a preliminary matter, we agree with the judge that the

2001 stipulation establishes the scope of the easement. In

addition, we agree with the judge that based on Doucette's

The stipulation provides that the Andresses' predecessors

"are entitled to use (for all purposes for which public ways are

customarily used in the town of Norton . . .) as access to and

from [the Andresses' predecessors' property] over and upon a

private way known as Meadowbrook Lane, and over and upon a

private way known as Pine Needle Lane."

testimony, which the judge credited, the proposed changes to the

lane will adversely affect the horses and, as a result, those

changes or improvements exceed the scope of the Andresses'

easement as it is defined by the stipulation.

However, that

the improvements proposed thus far were not permissible does not

mean that all improvements to the lane are prohibited by the

stipulation or the statute. There very well could be

improvements to the lane, which have not yet been proposed, that

would not be detrimental to its use by horses and that do "not

interfere with" or are not "inconsistent with the existing use"

of the lane. G. L. c. 187, § 5. Here, however, the amended

judgment explicitly prohibits any changes to the lane. The

amended judgment provides that the Andresses

"have the use of the right of way for travel only to access

their land, but do not have the right to use the right of

way to widen, change the topography, install conduits,

pipes, poles or other instrumentalities needed in

connection with utilities as a general right of way in a

private way is limited only to purposes of travel."

The Andresses argue that the judge should not have relied

on Doucette's testimony because she was not designated as an

expert. The argument requires little discussion. We discern no

error or unfair surprise. Doucette was qualified to testify as

to whether the proposed changes to the lane will be detrimental

to the horses and there was no objection to the testimony.

Further, the scope of the easement was squarely raised in the

Andresses' amended counterclaim which sought to enjoin

Meadowbrook from preventing the Andresses from improving the

lane and expressly asserted that the proposed changes would not

be detrimental to horses.

In so ruling, the judge interpreted the stipulation too broadly.

We do not comment or suggest what improvements might be

permissible, but insofar as the amended judgment prohibits any

changes to the width, topography, and the installation of any

utility components, even those that would not cause any harm to

horses, it goes too far.

Conclusion. The portion of the amended judgment

prohibiting the Andresses from making any changes to the lane is

vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for

entry of a modified injunction regarding the Andresses'

improvements to the lane consistent with this memorandum and

order. In all other respects, the amended judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Vuono,

Desmond & Toone, JJ.

Clerk

Entered: January 9, 2026.

The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

Docket Number - 24-P-1426main content

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